Psci 1100 A : Democratic Assessment Answers

The question over the legitimacy of the Europe Union (EU) has been a nearly continuous debate and many politicians of EU appear to agree that Europe Union suffers from a serious ‘democratic deficit’ (Karanikolos et al. 2013).

Does the EU suffer from a democratic deficit and, if so,

How can this be resolved?

Do the solutions reside only at the supranational level?

Does the EU suffer from a democratic deficit?

There is consistency to the contention of the “democratic deficit” when one assesses the independent beginnings of the several bodies that are engaged in the current formation of policies for the European Union. However, before elaborating on this subject, it is very important to gain in-depth knowledge of what is democratic deficit is true terms. A democratic deficit is a deficit that takes place when the democratic organizations fail to achieve what are credible to be the key principles of democracy (Majone 2010). The basis of contemporary democracy and good governance relies on the rights of the people to have their opinions heard and valued, which in turn would influence the enforcement of numerous measures and policies of legislation (Williams 2018). Within the domestic sphere, the liability of the government at the local level, to its citizens or voters is conserved through the parliament of the very nation. The voters could only fulfill democratic legitimacy when there is a favorable and high amount of trust in the political system as well as its institutional measures. These measures perform as a system for checking and balancing the authority of the ones who governs with the multitude contribution of people (Majone 2010). However, the deficit takes place when the citizen of the country perceives that the institutions of decision-making are maintained, in a way that is far off their influence but still has the ultimate power to implement and draft the policies that directly influences every citizen (Yami et al. 2018). Hence, the deficit has a perception problem. The system of checks and balance might prevail in some or the other formats but they are very far detached from the common citizen, so much so that they are literally ineffective and incapable to persuade the way of business and its future’s directional projection (Greskovits 2015).

It is indeed that there does exist a democratic deficit in the EU and the reasons behind this saying are numerous.  The detractors of the self-governing authority of the European Union be likely to point out three fundamental areas of the democratic liability and they are deliberative democracy, representative democracy and the participatory involvement (Curtin, Mair and Papadopoulos 2010). The deliberative democracy argues on all the issues among the citizen of Europe and the representative democracy is the national and European parliamentary involvement (Funk and McCombs 2017). There are number of factors that are consistent enough to support this argument on the presence of democratic deficit in the Europe (Sabel and Cohen 2017). It is an evident that the EU is very unresponsive to the democratic pressures present within the Europe (Dotti Sani and Magistro 2016). It is considered to draw strengths from the public opposition to the mass immigration and the cultural liberalization.  It is one of the fundamental features of democratic regimes that the voters have the right to change their government but within the EU, the case is quite different. Hence, in case if a resulting election in Europe is to transform the structure or arrangement of the parliament, it would then led to major changes in the policy in Europe because the parliament is amongst the three pillars that makes the legislation and the legislative power is been distributed among the parliament, the commission and the council.

It is also to be noted that the European integration has meant a decrease in the national parliamentary control and an increase in the executive power (Winzen 2013). In the domestic level, parliament could keep a trace of the executive but it is also not the issue in European standard. As per The Regional dimension of the European Union, the ministers’ council in the European level is not held to comprise for its activities in the European stage by their individual domestic parliaments and hence, exercise a much superior control on the Council of Ministers than they would be capable to do at a domestic level (Kelemen 2017). The institutions of the EU often deal with the unclear technicalities. 

It is also to be noted that there is transparency and complexity issue in the EU (Follesdal and Hix 2006). As per Abazi and Hillebrandt (2015), the council of ministers in Europe has failed to conduct their negotiation in a transparent and open manner. In a place where openness and transparency does exist in the European commission form, such a complex procedure which is adopted in this process results in all but the experts in situations of uncertainty. In turn, this results in isolation of the citizens because of ignorance of the complex system of procedural. With the same, there is also an existence of substantive imbalance issue (Runciman, Merry and Walton 2017). The broadening of the market in European region has left the EU commentators like Sevki Acuner and Daniel Hannan with a lots of leftist views and argument on the shortage. This also circumscribes the imbalance in between the capital and labor that is further worsen up by the independence of the above mentioned European market. Furthermore, there is also an issue of weakening of judicial control in the EU (Cheneval and Schimmelfenning 2013). There are many legal systems that possess the courts that have significant control and power for deciding the authority of the primary legislation of the country.

With the same, there is also a shortage of European political stage in Europe Union and this a very important issue to take in consideration in this context (Williams 2018) as because of the fact that there is no trace of Europe wide political parties that could, like any other democratic nation, take the initiative to compete with one another in the elections conducted in Europe. Such a political gap possibly results in the European citizens voting for the ones belonging from their very own domestic state that generally holds the much alike political ideals just like the government of the day (Matsuda 2018). This issue in no way serves the citizens of Europe because every individual state here elects a candidate from the domestic level for the parliament in Europe, which is representing or reflecting the best benefits of their own nations. However, one of the most significant points that maintain the dispute of existence of the deficit in EU is that no European Demos is there (Risse 2014). The populace of the EU is not a union of people as it is in the other countries such as in United States. Instead, it is a union of many people. A total number of 11 official European languages are there that are not taking account of the dialects and are also some of the very less spoken languages by the European minorities. Hence, they argue further for how is it possible to establish a democracy in the Europe Union when there is a lack of general community. They are of such an importance because of the fact that these general community are capable enough for particular structure of communication that comprise of most used means of informative media.

It is also to note that the political institutions usually gain legitimacy either from the “inputs” or the “outputs”. The inputs refers to the elections through which the ones who are exercising the power are held for accounting, while the output refers to the benefits that the institutions are supposed to deliver (Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014). The output legitimacy is hardly impressive and the Euro crisis in the country has weakened both of these sorts of legitimacy (Nicolaidis 2013). With the same, the economic growth in the country is also negative and the rate of unemployment in eurozone is more than 12%, while that of in Greece and Spain is more than 50% (Orbie 2016). It is of no evidence that whether the euro or the EU is delivering great deal in terms of benefits. The complexity of the decision making system along with the power that is distributed among many of the institutions, the accountability lines in the Europe  Union is never been clear enough. The perception of democratic deficit at present is a growing issue for the highly indebted countries belonging from the Eurozone (Karanikolos et al. 2013). As per the report of The European Union and Welfare State Reform, the European Central Bank, the European Commission as well as the Monetary Fund have forced the nation’s parliaments for accepting the budget cuts along with the structural reforms. The finance ministers of the eurzone and the heads of the government have taken big decisions on the issue of Europe Union bailout programs (Fernandez-Villaverde, Garicano, and Santos 2013). Hence, it is clear from the above evident that EU does suffers from a democratic deficit.

How can it be resolved?

Here comes the question of how can this be resolved. In this context, it is to be noted that until and unless the leaders of the European Union become more legitimate and credible in the views of the voters, the parts of union can start to collapse. Like, for example, at some of the points, the European government might want to strengthen the European currency by initiating major steps towards more united and un-segregated economic policy making system but those of their taken steps could be blocked by the general election or a national parliament, hence threatening the future of the Euro (Abeyratne 2017). With the same, the leaders of Europe should hurry on establishing a banking union in order to make the financial system of the country strong. Beside this, Germany must encourage demand which would help in making the Southern European economies to grow and develop.

It is also important for the Europe Union leaders to make the power more accountable. For many of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), the solution is simple (Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014). However, it is also true that despite its good work on some of the legislations, the European parliament has failed to persuade many of the people that it represents their interests (Van Dijk 2015). Many of the MEPs have very less connection with the national political systems of Europe. Many of the times, the priority of the parliament appears to be encouraging its very own powers (Orbie 2016). The parliament always seek for bigger European Union budget along with a larger role for the part of Europe Union but there is no evidence that many of the voters thinks in this same way. The reason behind it is  that although the power of the parliament have grown heavily right from the very first direct elections in the year 1979, the total turn-out have significantly fall or declined in every succeeding election that are conducted. According to the statistics, it is 43% in the year 2009 which is much less than 63% in the year 1979 (Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014).

Another reason for the failure of European parliament to be the key democratic check on the decision making of the eurozone is that maximum of the money for the bailouts as well as the conditions that are been applied to them are considered at the EU level by the finance ministers (Scharpf 2015). However, it is also true that their decision needs to be executed by the national parliaments that this therefore plays a very important part in both the recipient as well as in the donor countries- the Cyprus and the Bundestag respectively. One of the other possible solutions of this issue of democratic deficit is that to increase the engagement of the national parliamentarians in the governance of eurozone. The national parliamentarians can play a major role in making the European Unions more accountable in two ways. Firstly, the relationship or the link in between the national parliaments must be made strong. The treaty of Lisbon has created the procedure of “Yellow card”, in accordance with which if 1/3^rd or more of the total members in national parliaments believe that any proposal of the commission breaches the subsidiary, they have the right to ask from withdraw (Cooper 2013). This procedure could be made a “red card” procedure which would allow the national parliaments to pressurize the commission for withdrawing a proposal. A similar system can also play a great role in enabling the national parliaments to group together in order to make the commission proposal the withdrawal of an unnecessary law. Hence, the national parliaments should be given the right to veto the Commission proposals. Secondly, national parliamentary forum must be developed in the Brussels in order to monitors the European Council and to challenge the decisions made on the defense and foreign policy and counter terrorism.

With the same, it can also include that of directly electing the Commission President. Direct elections would be the most effective solutions of all as because of the fact that there is high need for bringing transparency to the council of ministers. They need to be open up to the common public and should also publish all the documents while acting in legislative capacity. It is also to monitor that negotiations are being conducted to the highest level by the national ministers instead of the diplomats. It will help in democratizing the Europe Union through a well-developed of the elected ministers and would further aid to media inspection of its decision via this light of openness and transparency. With the same, the voting system prevailing in Europe follows a closed list system (Hix et al. 2000). It has resulted in disconnection in between the voters and the politicians as the voters in this system are not allowed to choose their individual candidates. This system needs to get changed with the open-listed system or with the single transferrable votes that is at present being used in Ireland (Farrell. Suiter and Harris 2017). It would give the voters to choice to select their individual candidates and would hence establish a democratic link.

Does the solutions reside only at the supranational level?

The EU has supra-national institutions like the EP (European Parliament), the ECJ (European Court of Justice), the European Commission and the European Central Bank. Hence, this is why the EU is far away from being a nation-state formation. The solutions provided for resolving the democratic deficit in EU has made keeping this aspect of EU in mind. Hence, it can be said that the solution reside at the supranational level rather than limited to national level.  

Hence, after examining the above topic, it is to be concluded that Europe Union is suffering from serious democratic deficit. The paper has provided an in-depth understanding of the different dynamics and complexity with which the EU operates. The idea of democratic deficit is a poor result of the effort made by the European Commissions and Council of Ministers in order to establish such a platform for governance, which would be far away from the influence of the countrymen. However, this has resulted in such a condition of the country where most of the citizens feel like there is a deficit of democracy in the country and the government that is governing them is not transparent enough to trust. This has made Europe alleged by its people to be intricate enough and therefore now it is high time for accountability, clarity and transparency in order to govern the day in the future development of the country.

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